Unanimous acquittals for Charlotte Noddings in kidnap case – but should the law be reformed?

January 28, 2025

Last week, Charlotte Noddings secured unanimous acquittals for 7 counts her client faced in a case of kidnap and associated offences.

The Crown’s case against the defendant was that he had asked a woman to get into his car, under the guise of giving her a lift home, and then drove her through Leeds away from her home address. Part of the Crown’s case was that the defendant, at some time, formed the intention to take her to Manchester. It was also alleged that during the course of the journey, the defendant sexually assaulted the complainant and carried with him offensive weapons with the intention to injure.

The case was, in effect, one word against the other. The trial, which ran for 7 days, was heard at Leeds Crown Court. After a number of hours in deliberation, the jury returned unanimous not guilty verdicts.

Charlotte Noddings was instructed by Rob Rode and Lauren Winn of ABR Solicitors.

See below for Charlotte’s discussion of the law.


Kidnap is a common law offence. With no statutory instrument or definitions to cling to, what the offence entails and what may amount to a kidnap has evolved only through the statements of the appellate courts over hundreds of years.

The leading case on the elements of kidnap is R v D [1984] AC 778 where Lord Brandon defined the offence as having the following ingredients:

[1] the taking or carrying away of one person by other another person;

[2] by force or fraud;

[3] without the consent of the person so taken and carried; and

[4] without lawful excuse.

Whilst clear in writing, the interrelationships between these ingredients have continued to cause problems when a case of kidnap is adjudicated upon.

These issues were discussed at length by the Law Commission in reports in 2011 and 2014[1]. However, 11 years on, the law remains the same.

In this case, issues arose in relation to the use of force and what that could amount to. The Crown’s case was that at some point in the journey the defendant formed the intention to kidnap and therefore the force by which she was subject to was the force of keeping her in the car. It was argued by the defence that this would in fact be akin to false imprisonment and kidnap requires more than this. It has always been considered the aggravated offence of false imprisonment. It was argued that being kept in the car amounted to the deprivation of liberty, required for a kidnap, but not necessarily the force of taking her. This case, it was alleged the defendant then grabbed the leg of the complainant as she tried to leave. As kidnap is a continuing offence, was that one act enough to amount to force such that the kidnap was committed at that point? In principle, possibly. The law is unhelpfully unclear. If the law is to be interpreted as being kept in a moving car amounting to force, it begs the question why have the two offences of false imprisonment and kidnap in the first place?

This case was summed up by the judge as a kidnap by force. However, had it been kidnap by fraud, the current law raises further problems. The Crown must prove that the person was taken or carried without consent. This raises further questions as to what is meant by consent. Do you apply the common law definition or rely on the regime now applied in cases of sexual offences? This question arose in the report produced by the Law Commission.  Technically, the traditional rule continues to apply. The traditional rule for when consent is vitiated by deception is that consent to any act is vitiated if, and only if, the person is deceived as to 1) the nature of the act to which the person supposedly consents or 2) the identity of the person performing the act[2]. Furthermore, the current offence of kidnap is further complicated if a person cannot consent through a lack of capacity.  The offence of child abduction only goes so far. As our understanding of capacity and culpability grows, it is only right that the law adapts with it.

The current law raises more questions than it answers and this is not a problem which can be solved by the appellate courts simply handing down judgement. As stated by Lord Judge, the then Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales in the case of Kayani [2011] EWCA Crim 2871, “it is not open to this court to redefine the ingredients of the common law offence of kidnapping, at any rate, by extending its ambit…the Law Commission may or may not recommend reform of the common law offence of kidnapping. If it does, any relevant reforms would require legislation”[3].

The Law Commission recommended that the common law offence of kidnap should be replaced by a statute. Their recommendation would remove the requirement for consent. Thus, better protecting those with a lack of capacity. The change would also address the problematic interrelationships between the ingredients. It is not clear why a new offence of kidnap has not yet hit the statute books but in my view, it is about time it did.

[1] Simplification of Criminal Law: kidnapping and related offences report.

[2] 2.52 of Simplification of Criminal Law: kidnapping and related offences 2014.

[3] R v Kayani [2011] EWCA Crim 2871