Supreme Court redefines the boundaries: Ridley v Brown [2025] UKSC 7

February 27, 2025

by Julius Klutse and Emily McCurrie

Introduction

On 26 February 2025, the Supreme Court handed down its unanimous judgment in Ridley v Brown [2025] UKSC 7, clarifying the meaning of paragraph 5(4)(c) of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). Lord Briggs gave the lead judgment with whom Lord Hamblen, Lord Stephens, Lady Rose, and Lady Simler all agree.

Schedule 6 reformed the adverse possession regime, establishing the framework and new conditions under which adverse possession of registered land may be relied upon for the purpose of obtaining registered title. The reduced role for adverse possession under the 2002 Act allows an applicant to be registered as proprietor, if he has been in adverse possession of the estate for the period of ten years ending on the date of the application (para. 1(1) of Schedule 6).

Paragraph 5 of Schedule 6 introduces three additional conditions, the third of which – the boundary condition – was relevant in this case. The contested aspect of the boundary condition was paragraph 5(4)(c), which requires that “for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him.”

The Supreme Court was tasked with deciding the correct construction of paragraph 5(4)(c) – was it ten years ending on the date of the application, or any ten years?

Background

In October 2019, Mr Brown discovered that his neighbours, Mr and Mrs Ridley, were constructing a house on part of his land. On 20 December 2019, the Ridleys sought to establish their right to do so by way of an application to the Land Registry, to be registered as proprietors on the basis of adverse possession. Mr Brown objected to their application.

The Land Registry referred the matter to the First-tier Tribunal, which sided with the Ridleys, preferring the ‘any ten years’ construction. Judge Bastin found that the Ridleys had been in adverse possession since 2004 and that they had reasonably believed that they had owned the land from that date until February 2018, when they made an application for planning permission.

Mr Brown appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), which allowed his appeal, following and being bound by the decision in Zarb v Parry [2011] EWCA Civ 1306. In Zarb v Parry, the Court of Appeal treated the ten-year period as the ten years ending on the date of the application. In his judgment, Mr Justice Edwin Johnson, President of the Lands Chamber, explained, however, that he preferred the ‘any ten years’ construction (contrary to Zarb v Parry), and as such, granted a ‘leapfrog’ certificate enabling the Ridleys to apply directly to the Supreme Court.

Tanita Cross wrote an article analysing the Land Chamber’s decision last year.

The Supreme Court Appeal

Arguments

The leapfrog appeal came before the Supreme Court on 21 January 2025. Mr Brown argued that a reasonable belief should exist up until the date of the application because:

1. The overall objective of the reform of adverse possession was to reduce its potentially adverse impact upon the conclusivity of the register as determinative of land ownership.
2. A squatter who at no time before making the application for registration thinks he is a trespasser is a more deserving applicant than one who continues adversely to possess the relevant land after his reasonable belief ceases.
3. The construction ignores the flexibility of the de minimis
4. The minimisation of disparities between registered title and possession on the ground, coupled with the need to encourage the use of registration, militates in favour of a requirement that applications for registration be promptly made.
5. The construction will not exclude those who apply for registration as a way of managing the risk that their continued reasonable belief as to ownership turns out to be wrong.
6. The ‘any ten years’ construction would cause real forensic difficulty for registered owners, who might face assertions of reasonable belief held in the distant past.
7. The ‘any ten years’ construction potentially falls foul of the requirement for conformity with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), in relation to a provision which was, on any view, expropriatory.

The Ridleys argued that the ‘any ten years’ construction was correct because:

1. A close grammatical reading of the reasonable belief part of the boundary condition supports the ‘any ten years’ construction.
2. The essential problem with the alternative construction was that it would render it practically impossible in most cases for an applicant ever to be able to satisfy the boundary condition.
3. No attempt to have recourse to a de minimis principle comes near to addressing that problem.
4. There is no basis for implying a period of grace into the reasonable belief requirement, not least because such a period is expressly provided to cope with the effect of eviction upon the continuity of adverse possession. By contrast a period of grace is unnecessary (or perhaps built in) under construction B.
5. The supposed forensic difficulties of a ten year assertion of reasonable belief buried in past history are greatly exaggerated.
6. Since the old regime for adverse possession was human rights compatible, the new much reduced regime must be a fortiori

Decision

The Supreme Court found that the ‘any ten years’ construction was correct and allowed the appeal.

The Justices found that the intention of the 2002 Act was to confine adverse possession rights more closely than before, but not to wholly remove them. Lord Briggs held in his lead judgment, that paragraph 5(4)(c) does not account for a de minimis period and that any potential applicant will need time more than a de minimis period to take legal advice, gather evidence and give consideration, before making an application. It follows that paragraph 5(4)(c) is construed as requiring ‘any ten years’ on the ordinary meaning of the words.

The status of Zarb v Parry

The Court found that in Zarb v Parry, Lady Arden – who delivered one of the two key judgments – appeared to assume that the reasonable belief must exist up to the date of the application, without considering the ‘any ten years’ construction. However, as the distinction was not central to the Court of Appeal’s decision and was not argued before her, her assumption lacks reasoning and carries limited persuasive weight, the Supreme Court held. Consequently, it is no longer good authority, given that the Supreme Court now clarified in favour of the ‘any ten years’ construction.

Human Rights

The Court held that the large reduction in the scope of the rights created by adverse possession under the 2002 Act, compared with the old regime, means that it is unarguable that it falls outside the UK’s margin of appreciation, whichever construction of the knowledge requirement in the boundary condition is adopted.

Comment

The judgment provides welcome clarification on the timing of an application for adverse possession under paragraph 5(4)(c) and does away with the need for a futile rush to make an application on cessation of the reasonable belief. An applicant must now hold a reasonable belief that they own the land for any ten-year period during their period of adverse possession.

This decision is also a helpful reminder that neighbours in a boundary dispute may benefit from first determining the precise boundary under section 60 of the 2002 Act before engaging in a lengthy adverse possession dispute. Clarifying the boundary early on can help establish whether the squatter was in adverse possession for what we now know must be any ten-year period, potentially saving time and costs for all parties involved.

You can read Lord Briggs leading judgment in full on the Supreme Court website.

Brynmor Adams of Exchange Chambers represented Mr Brown, led by Stephanie Tozer KC and instructed by James Douglas of DWF.